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Many people believe economic growth, development, and job creation in the Muslim world could 
help drain support from radical and fundamentalist groups. Few seem willing to do much about 
it.[1] 
– Edward Gesser 
   
The notion that the poor countries of the world can in any reasonable interval achieve rich-country 
incomes without trade and capital flows is utterly implausible. If the poor countries of the world 
have to depend on themselves for the saving to finance the investment that they need, or have to 
develop themselves the skills and technology they need to become rich by our standards, its 
going to take forever.[2] 
– Nobel Laureate Robert Solow 
   
Introduction  
An increasingly held view is that many of the economic and social problems confronting most 
Middle Eastern countries stem from their failure to become more integrated into the global 
economy. The benefits of globalization are widely documented. As noted in a recent World Bank 
report:  
Globalization generally reduced poverty because more integrated economies tend to grow faster 
and this growth is usually widely diffused. As low income countries break into global markets for 
manufactures and services, poor people can move from the vulnerability of grinding rural poverty 
to better jobs, often in towns or cities. In addition to the structural relocation, integration raises 
productivity job by job.[3]  
Along these lines, President Bush has noted:  
Across the globe, free markets and trade have helped defeat poverty, and taught men and 
women the habits of liberty. So I propose the establishment of a U.S.-Middle East Free Trade 
Area within a decade, to bring the Middle East into an expanding circle of opportunity, to provide 
hope for the people who live in that region.[4]  
With that statement, on May 9, 2003, President Bush set out his vision of establishing a U.S.-
Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2013. MEFTA’s main focus is to work with countries in 
the region in graduated steps to increase their trade and investment with the United States in 
particular, and the world economy in general. A critical component of this program is the 
assistance to be provided to these countries in implementing domestic reforms, instituting the rule 
of law, protecting private property rights and in creating a foundation for openness, economic 
growth and prosperity.  
The purpose of the sections below is to examine several conceptual issues surrounding the 
phenomena of world-wide globalization, the environment in which the MEFTA will operate and 
central to the program’s ultimate success. In particular:  
1. What are the best ways of measuring the progress at globalization?  
2. The progress made towards globalization by the key Middle Eastern countries?  
3. The policies most often associated with improved levels of globalization? In light of this 
discussion, a final section assesses the likely effectiveness of U.S. and West’s efforts 
towards assisting the region’s integration into the world system.  
Magnitude of the Problem  
The MEFTA is an ambitious plan, but one venturing into largely uncharted waters. The one thing 
most observers agree on is the magnitude of the problem—by most of the standard metrics the 
countries in the region are currently ill prepared to thrive in the world system (Table 1).[5] In this 
regard a litany of indicators documents the weakness of the region’s linkages to the world 
economy: Import tariffs average over 20 percent; most of the larger countries in the region are not 
members (Table 2) of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the international agency largely 
responsible for reducing trade barriers and reconciling disputes over trade practices. Perhaps 
even more telling, the region’s share of world exports has fallen steadily and the region as a 
whole attracts roughly as much foreign direct investment as Sweden.[6] A broader set of 
problems have been compiled by Anthony Cordesman:[7]  
· Massive population increases: The Middle East and North Africa had a population of 112 
million in 1950. The population is well over 415 million today. Most likely it will more than 
double again reaching at least 833 million by 2050.  
· A youth explosion, especially in the 20-24 age brackets. This is the key age group for 
new job entrants and has grown steadily from 10 million in 1950 to 36 million today. 
Growth is expected to remain steady reaching at least 56 million by 2050.  
· A failure to achieve global competitiveness, diversify economies and create productive 
jobs. Direct and disguised unemployment ranges from 12-20% in many countries. The 
high percentage of the population entering the labor force only compounds this problem.  
· A steady decline in non-petroleum exports as a percentage of world trade over the last 
half a century, and an equal pattern of decline in regional GDP as a share of global GDP.  
· Over-urbanization and a half century decline in agricultural and traditional trades impose 
high levels of stress on traditional social safety nets and extended families. The urban 
population seem to have been under 15 million in 1950. It has since more than doubled 
from 84 million in 1980 to 173 million today, and some 25% of the population will soon 
live in cities of one million or more.  
· Broad problems in integrating women effectively and productively into the work force. 
While female employment in the MENA region has grown in recent years it still averages 
15% lower than in high growth areas such as East Asia.  
· Growing pressures on young men and women in the Middle East and North Africa to 
immigrate to Europe and the US to find jobs and economic opportunities—a process that 
inevitably creates new tensions and adjustment problems.  
· Little regional trade. Almost all nations in the region have as their major trading partners 
economies outside the region. Furthermore increased intraregional trade offers little or no 
comparative advantage.  
· Increasing water scarcity. Much of the region cannot afford to provide more water for 
agriculture at market prices—many countries have become permanent importers of food.  
· A failed or inadequate growth in infrastructure and in key areas like housing and 
education.  
The Middle East region also lags considerably behind other parts of the world in various aspects 
of liberalization (Table 3). In particular a significant gap exists across all measures of governance 
(in Table 3 larger values indicate better governance) between MENA and non-MENA countries. 
While the MENA countries have closed this gap a bit in recent years it is still striking in the area of 
voice and accountability.  
On the other hand the MENA countries compare fairly favorably to non-MENA countries in 
several areas of economic freedom (in Table 3 large values indicate lower levels of economic 
freedom)—monetary policy, regulation and the size of the informal (black) market. Still, the 
region’s trade policies, government intervention, foreign investment, and flexibility in wages and 
prices lag behind other parts of the world.  
Globalization—Conceptual Issues  
When examining globalization, one of the first and most difficult issues is to address is an 
operational definition of the phenomena. Even a casual reading of the literature leads one to the 
realization that globalization means quite different things to different people. Somewhat in the 
spirit of the MEFTA program, globalization can be seen as the growing liberalization of 
international trade and investment that results in increases in the integration of national 
economies.[8] Henderson has expanded this definition to define globalization as consisting of five 
related but distinct parts:  
· The increasing tendency for firms to think, plan, operate and invest for the future with 
reference to markets and opportunities across the world as a while.  
· The growing ease and cheapness of international communications, with the Internet as 
the leading aspect.  
· The trend towards closer international economic integration, resulting in the diminished 
importance of political boundaries. This trend is fueled partly by the first two trends, but 
even more powerfully by official policies aimed at trade and investment liberalization.  
· The apparently growing significance of issues and problems extending beyond national 
boundaries and the resulting impetus to deal with tem through some form of 
internationally concerted action.  
· The tendency towards uniformity (or harmonization by which norms, standards, rules and 
practices are defined and enforced with respect to regions or the world as a whole rather 
than within the bounds of national states.)  
Mujahid[9] suggests we view globalization in the manner in which it is perceived by various 
governments/groups. To Mujahid, globalization is the blending of four main perspectives: 
economic, technological, development and societal. The economic perspective focuses primarily 
on the growth of world trade and the recent explosion in foreign direct investment whereas the 
technological perspective of globalization stresses the importance of new technologies in the 
communication and transport sectors. The development perspective focuses on the impact on 
growth brought on by increased globalization. In this regard and depending on the circumstances 
globalization may provide the mechanisms for converging incomes around the world—the neo-
classical interpretation. Or, under another set of circumstances, globalization may result in 
diverging income levels with the world split between rich and poor countries—the endogenous 
growth interpretation.[10]  
Lastly, the societal perspective focuses on some key factors that the globalization process 
impacts, and may include the condition of human rights, women empowerment, gender 
sensitization, civic education, status of women in the society, political status becoming more 
democratic, freedom of speech a, rule of law, equal access to resources and level of education. 
As with much of the globalization literature, Mujahid is unclear as to causation. For example do 
improvements in the governance indicators noted above (Table 3) cause increased levels of 
globalization or are they induced to higher levels of attainment by the globalization process? Or, 
does a feedback process exist between the two?  
A third way of examining globalization it to view it as a historical process. This approach is best 
summarized by Sen [11] who has noted that globalization is neither new, nor is it just 
Westernization: globalization has progressed over thousands of years through travel, trade, 
migration, spread of cultural influences and dissemination of knowledge and understanding and 
has enriched the world scientifically and culturally. Sen suggests that various parts of the world 
have evolved somewhat differently over the last several decades and, as a result, possess 
economic environments that have different potentials for growth, technological absorption, 
responding to external shocks and interacting with the global economy.  
The different approaches to examining globalization while providing valuable insights to the 
phenomena also illustrate the problems confronting researchers in the area. Globalization is a 
complex, multi-dimensional, historical process that does not lend itself easily characterization or 
measurement. In fact, despite the volumes written on globalization, relatively little progress has 
been devoted to coming up with a generally accepted measure of the concept. Has globalization 
progressed more in Turkey than Egypt and if so by how much and in what respect? Or as noted 
by the A.T. Kearny Corporation:[12]  
For instance, how do we determine the extent to which a country has become embedded within 
the global economy? How do we demonstrate that globalization is racing ahead, rather than just 
limping along? Clearly, the lack of a clear, precise definition underlies much of the current 
arguments and debates overmuch the extent of globalization and the manner that phenomenon is 
changing the structure of national economies. Without the means to quantify the extent of 
globalization, any meaningful evolution of its effects will remain elusive.  
The Measurement of Globalization  
The few attempts made at quantifying globalization are often little more than rankings of countries 
according to various criteria, such as the share of trade in Gross Domestic Product, or the 
percentage of investment accounted for by foreign direct investment (FDI). Such comparisons 
may be informative, but they suffer from arbitrariness in the selection of data. More fundamentally, 
since countries usually rank differently depending on the data series selected, how should these 
series be combined to form an unambiguous summary metric of globalization?  
An attempt to overcome these problems has been made in the annual A.T. Kearney/Foreign 
Policy Magazine Globalization Index (KFPGI).[13] This aggregate index includes over 60 
countries and is derived from measures of four main dimensions of globalization: (1) technology 
(number of Internet users, Internet hosts, and secure severs), (2) political engagement (number 
of memberships in international organization, U.N security council missions in which each country 
participates and foreign embassies that each country hosts), (3) personal contact (international 
travel and tourism, international telephone traffic, and cross-border transferees) and (4) economic 
integration (trade, foreign direct investments and portfolio capital flows and income payments and 
receipts). The four dimensions are then aggregated into an overall summary measure of 
globalization.[14]  
While the KFPGI represents a breakthrough in conceptualizing the globalization process, it is not 
without its critics. As with any index of this sort, it contains a certain element of arbitrariness:[15] 
(1) Are the measures included in the index better than any other conceivable set? (2) Is the 
weighting system more meaningful than other possibilities? (3) Should efforts be made to correct 
for the size of countries?—if Sweden doesn’t host as many foreign embassies as the United 
States is it somehow less globalized—the Kearney index would say yes.  
A quick look at the KFPGI (Table 4) shows the Middle Eastern countries clustered towards the 
bottom. Out of the 62 countries covered, the region’s most globalized country in 2002 was Israel 
(22). Tunisia (35) is the only other Middle Eastern country in the top 40.  
Several features of the index are also of interest. First, there seems to be great year-to-year 
variation. Morocco ’s ranking fell 18 notches between 2002 and 2001 while Egypt’s fell by 12. 
Ruling out some sort of calamity (natural or financial), this is not something one would expect in 
the real world. Because there is considerable over-all stability in the rankings of countries, 
occasional movements such as Morocco ’s can not be attributed an ordinal ranking system that 
by its very nature might overstate the degree of change. Second, country rankings vary 
considerably across the different dimensions of globalization. The United States ranks first on the 
technological dimension, but 56th on the economic dimension. Third, some of the rankings seem 
counter-intuitive. One would not expect the United States (at 56th on the economic dimension) to 
be less globalized than Pakistan (at 55th). Is Tunisia at 35th really more globalized than Taiwan 
at 36th? Common sense says no.  
Several of these anomalies can be eliminated by smoothing over the KFPGI through the use of 
Factor Analysis.[16] Clearly the four KFPGI dimensions of globalization are not independent of 
each other, and a factor analysis of them can test to determine the extent to which they are 
correlated to another (unmeasured) dimension which we might dub “General Globalization.” In 
turn each country can be ranked in terms of its attainment on this “General Globalization” 
dimension.  
The results of this smoothing exercise (Table 5) suggest a possible alternative to the KFPGI. The 
KFPGI summary index (0.815), the technical dimension of globalization (0.924) as well as the 
personal (0.660) and economic dimension (0.586) are all fairly highly correlated with this General 
Globalization measure. Only the political dimension seems to stand alone and represent a 
somewhat independent aspect of globalization. Using this new General Globalization scale, the 
ranking of countries changes somewhat. The United States is now ranked 2 rather than 7, while 
Taiwan is ranked 6th rather than 36th. These changes seem more realistic than the original 
KFPGI rankings.  
On the other hand, the picture for many other countries is more or less the same—Morocco is 
now 46th rather than 47th, Egypt is 54th rather than 60 th and so on. More importantly, the new 
rankings illustrate the fundamental problem of globalization indexes. Ultimately, all are arbitrary.  
Globalization and Reforms  
Despite its limitations, the KFPGI is still the only readily available quantification of globalization. 
As such its value to policy makers lies in its potential to identify many key relationships critical for 
national economic development. In their efforts to globalize, should the Middle Eastern countries 
focus on economic reforms or improved governance? Or, are both types of reforms of relatively 
equal importance? Are some reforms more effective in the economic area while others best for 
improving the technological aspect of globalization?  
The Kearney/Foreign Policy Summary Measure of Globalization  
Splitting the KFPGI over-all ranking of countries into two groups—the top 31 countries or highly 
globalized economies and the bottom 31 countries or, lesser globalized countries, produces 
several patterns. First significant differences in governance exist between the two groups of 
countries (Table 6). On all of the major dimensions of governance, the top group has significantly 
higher scores. The greatest gap between the two groups appears to be in the control of 
corruption followed by the rule of law and government effectiveness.  
While the high globalizers also outperform the low globalizers in most of the economic areas 
(high values in the economic areas indicate a lower level of attainment), the differences between 
the two do not appear nearly as large as in the governance measures. In fact the low globalizers 
have lower fiscal burdens than their high globalizer counterparts. In the economic area the high 
globalizers have the biggest lead in eliminating the informal (black) markets, developing sound 
banking and finance sectors and in implementing good trade policy (openness).  
Given the KFPGI rankings and country reform efforts in the governance and economic freedom 
areas, its possible to assess [17] the extent to which globalization is linked to the progress made 
in a country’s liberalization efforts. Put differently, which reforms or interaction of reforms drive 
globalization [18]?  
The results of this assessment produced some interesting findings (Figure 1). First, governance 
measures dominated the country grouping structure best describing the KFPGI ranking. 
Specifically, based on progress made in improving the rule of law, countries can be grouped[19] 
into three distinct categories: (1) a low rule of law grouping of 31 countries with a mean 
globalization score of 45.8, (2) a medium attainment rule of law grouping of 19 countries with a 
mean globalization score 22.6, and (3) a final group of 12 countries at the high-end of the rule of 
law scale. This group’s mean ranking on the KFPGI scale was 8.5.  
Second, for the bottom two clusters of countries, an additional statistically significant split exists. 
This split is controlled by progress made in an average of the six measures of governance. For 
the 31 low rule of law countries, this split produces two more distinct sets of countries—25 
countries with low overall governance and 6 countries with a moderate level of governance. The 
first group contains 6 Middle East (and Pakistan ) countries, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. These countries clearly are at the lower end of the governance scale with there 
globalization prospects held back by the lack of progress in this area. Tunisia ’s governance 
efforts have paid off somewhat placing that country in the next set of countries. Finally, Israel with 
the highest level of governance and globalization in the region is classified along with 12 other 
countries in the medium rule of law, good overall governance grouping. This group has a mean 
globalization score of 26.8.  
As noted earlier, causation is always an issue in discussions of globalization. In this case is it 
possible to argue that improved levels of globalization (however attained) placed pressure on 
governments to improve their rule of law in order to remain competitive in the world economy? Or 
is the relationship from mainly from one of improved rule of law facilitating a higher level of 
globalization?  
To test the manner in which globalization and the rule of law impact each other a similar 
classification tree exercise was performed with the rule of law assumed to be determined by 
globalization. The other 5 governance measures and the 10 economic freedom measures were 
included as possible determinants of the rule of law. The results (Figure 2) suggest that 
improvements in the rule of law are largely controlled by corruption and not globalization. As 
control of corruption improves, there tends to be is a corresponding gain in the rule of law—
globalization does not appear to place an independent set of pressures on countries to revamp 
their legal systems. From this, we can tentatively conclude that improved governance, in this case 
through the rule of law, provides support for increased degrees of globalization.  
Figure 1: Factors Affecting the Kearney /Foreign Policy Globalization Ranking  
The General Globalization Index  
To see if the general globalization index derived (Table 5) from the KFPGI rankings paints an 
analogous picture, a similar classification analysis was performed on the index presented in Table 
5. The results (Figure 3) are of the same rough order of magnitude as was the case with the 
KFPGI. Again, governance reforms dominate the structure of relationships, with corruption 
entering directly (rather than through the rule of law as with the KFPGI) to partition the 
globalization index into three groups of countries.  
As expected, a country’s globalization ranking improves with improved control over corruption. 
Countries with high levels of corruption can offset this impediment somewhat through improving 
their regulatory quality as in the case of Turkey. Clearly though, a more efficient strategy is to 
face corruption directly as in the case of Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. Finally 
causation likely runs directly from corruption to globalization (higher negative means in Figure 3 
represent higher ranks on the general globalization index).  
Figure 2: Factors Affecting the Rule of Law Index  
  
Figure 3: Factors Affecting the General Globalization Index 
The results from the analysis of the general globalization index suggest that the KFPGI rankings 
in the sub categories of technology, economic globalization, personal globalization, and political 
globalization are likely to be robust enough to warrant further analysis.  
The Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Sub-Components  
In the case of technological globalization (Figure 4), economic variables enter for the first time. 
Countries fall into groups of ascending technological globalization depending on the extent to 
which they formulate an open trade policy. Specifically, the twenty-four countries with a very open 
trade policy have a mean technological globalization ranking of 13.5, whereas the bottom 12 
countries in terms of trade openness have a mean ranking of 51.75 (with 62 the lowest rank).  
Figure 4: Factors Affecting the Kearney Globalization/Technology Index  
Those countries at the top of the trade policy scale have improved their technological 
globalization ranking even further through the establishment of a high quality regulatory 
environment. Of the Middle Eastern countries in our sample, only Israel appears position to 
increase through improved regulation its regulatory environment. Turkey on the other hand falls in 
an intermediate trade-openness group. The country’s low mean score on the technological 
globalization index is due to its trade policies, but within that context, could be improved 
somewhat through improved political stability.  
Unfortunately most of our sample Middle Eastern countries fall in the bottom category due to their 
relatively closed economies. If these countries want to get linked in with the flow of world-wide 
technological information, they must place concerted efforts into opening their economies through 
improved trade policy. As noted above, given the fact that several of these countries are not even 
members of the World Trade Organization, it may take some years before significant progress is 
made in the technological area.  
KFPGI rankings are controlled by political stability with three main clusters of countries 
partitioning the rankings (Figure 5). Most of the Middle Eastern countries fall in the lower group, 
with only Tunisia and Saudi Arabia advancing to an intermediate group of countries with a mean 
ranking on the globalization scale of 26.9. Again governance measures dominate the country 
grouping process. Still, this result is somewhat surprising in the sense that none of the 10 major 
measures of economic freedom play a statistically significant role in affecting the grouping of 
countries along this dimension of globalization.  
Figure 5: Factors Affecting the Kearney Economic Globalization Index  
Government effectiveness is the most significant factor clustering countries along the personal 
globalization dimension (Figure 6). In contrast to several of the previous globalization dimensions, 
the Middle Eastern countries are fairly spread out along the personal globalization scale, with 
Turkey, Pakistan and Iran in the bottom group of countries, while Israel and Tunisia are in a group 
of 19 countries just below the top group.  
Figure 6: Factors Affecting the Kearney Personal Globalization Index 
Finally, the main split in the political globalization scale of countries is formed by the voice-
accountability measure of governance (Figure 7). Two groups of countries are present: a fairly 
large group of 37 countries with relatively high deficiencies in voice and accountability and a 
higher group of 15 countries with a mean political globalization ranking of 16. All of the Middle 
Eastern countries fall in the low group. While countries in the high group appear to have the 
option of increasing their globalization along this dimension through improved trade openness, 
the Middle Eastern countries will have to place most of their efforts into improved voice 
governance before this option becomes available.  
Assessment  
While imperfect, the FKPGI is capable of providing some useful insights to the process of 
globalization. For the Middle East countries wishing to improve their integration into the world 
system, improvements in the various areas of governance have the greatest pay-offs at the 
present time. In this sense the U.S. approach developed in its recently proposed Broader Middle 
East Initiative[20], focusing on democracy and governance issues appears on the right track.  
The task is enormous, however, facing considerable resistance throughout the region. In part, 
some of this resistance may stem from the fact that there is a sizeable imbalance in the way the 
region has preceded with liberalization. Much more progress has been made in the economic 
freedom area relative to the various dimensions of governance. No doubt this has resulted in 
many of the key countries being exposed to some of the competitive rigors of international 
competition, while at the same time not possessing the domestic institutions capable of enabling 
the countries to take advantage of opportunities opened up by increased integration into the world 
system. This has resulted in a negative perception of globalization throughout most of the region.  
Figure 7: Factors Affecting the Kearney Political Globalization Index 
Several years ago and before September 11, the CIA’s[21] view of globalization in the Middle 
East resembled in part the bleak picture painted at the start of this essay:  
1. By 2015 in much of the Middle Eat populations will be Significantly Larger, poorer, more 
urban and increasingly disillusioned.  
2. More than half the population if the Middle East region is below 20 years of age; this will 
also be the case in 2015, with the labor force growing at an average rate of 3.1 percent a 
year. Weak educational systems will have produced a generation lacking the technical 
and problem-solving skills required to accelerate economic growth.  
3. Attracting foreign direct investment will also be difficult: except for projects in the energy 
sector investors will, on the whole, tend to shy away from these countries, discouraged 
by overbearing state sectors, heavy, opaque and arbitrary government regulation, 
underdeveloped financial sectors, inadequate physical infrastructure, and the threat of 
political instability.  
4. With the exception of Israel, Middle Eastern states will view globalization more as a 
challenge than an opportunity.  
5. Although the internet will remain confined to a small elite due to relatively high cost, 
underdeveloped infrastructures, and cultural obstacles, the information revolution and 
other technological advances probably will have a new destabilizing effect on the Middle 
East by raising expectations, increasing income disparities and eroding the power of 
regimes to control information or mound popular opinion.  
6. Most Middle Eastern governments recognize the need for economic restructuring and 
even a modicum of greater political participation, but they will proceed cautiously fearful 
of undermining their rule.  
7. The nature of many Arab regimes is likely to push them to cling to more traditional 
paradigms. Inequalities between and within states will grow with devastating effects on 
economic opportunity, resulting in increasing poverty and alienation of the masses.  
8. No single ideology or philosophy will unite any one state or group of states in response to 
these challenges, although popular resentment of globalization—which is perceived in 
the Middle East as a western intrusion—will be widespread.  
In addition to these factors and the negative perception of globalization stemming from the reform 
imbalances noted above, the failure of most Middle Eastern countries to participate actively in the 
world system stems from the fact that, with the notable exception of Israel, globalization has been 
presented in largely ideological terms. It has been promoted by a few, but attacked by many more 
as a new version of imperialism or unequal power.[22] A common perception throughout the 
region, perhaps a holdover from colonial days, is that increased globalization is a threat to 
political, economic and cultural independence. Imagined dangers include:[23]  
1. The imposition of a cultural homogeneity based on western secular market-based values;  
2. The example set by internationally sanctioned and highly selective interventions against 
“pariah states” such as Sudan, Libya and Iran;  
3. The use of notions of human rights to push agendas driven by European and US 
concerns with gender equality, youth culture and sexual freedom; and  
4. The destruction of local industry by outside competition and the imposition of unattainable 
labor and work-place standards.  
Many of these negative views of globalization are reinforced by governments afraid of 
transparency and a variety of vested interests anxious to protect privileged monopolies created 
during the high tide of protectionism. Even regimes which claim to be committed to promoting 
globalization—such as Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco—hover ambiguously between entry 
into the new global order and the type of managed modernization more characteristic of the 
immediate post-colonial period.  
In short, while the attempts on the part of the West to encourage more democratization and 
improved governance in the region are will intended, these efforts are not likely to find many like 
minded advocates in the region in positions of authority. These realities suggest that the U.S. and 
the West’s objectives might be better served through a more low-key approach toward assisting 
the Middle Eastern countries into the world system. In this regard the recently proposed Middle 
East Free Trade Association (MEFTA) might be an effective alternative to the more direct Middle 
East Initiative approach.  
For one thing, the analysis above suggests that a more open trade policy has a direct link to 
improved technological globalization. Tr ade policy also appears to improve political globalization. 
Building on these types of relationships a recent OECD study[24] found that increased trade 
openness was a strong factor reducing corruption, a key governance dimension currently holding 
back the region.  
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